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The Changing Tides of the Republican Party during Reconstruction 
Writing Process 
I wrote the following essay throughout the semester in my ASI 120 course in multiple stages. My reading 
of Eric Foner’s A Short History of Reconstruction helped me generate my topic of interest and 
contextualize my historiographical argument. My instructor assigned the class reading responses to 
Foner’s historiography, which exercised my skills in writing explanatory summaries and academic 
responses. I next drafted my formal topic proposal to serve as the basis of my descriptive argument, the 
first paragraph of my introduction. I gathered a collection of eight historiographical sources and 
summarized each of them, while drawing upon the skills I practiced and developed throughout ASI 110 
and in the Foner Response assignments. After writing the Annotated Bibliography, I examined each of the 
sources to construct my own historiographical argument. During the writing process, I consulted my 
instructor, Dr. Mackay, and the CORE Write Place consultants to polish my essay. Dr. Mackay also gave my 
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The Changing Tides of the Republican 
Party during Reconstruction 
Nicholas Panson 
During Congressional Reconstruction, the Republican Party substantially shifted 
away from its former radical ideological orientation. Republicans notably 
abandoned their expansive, prized social policies such as the “labor question” and 
freedmen’s rights. The party once strongly clung to radicalism during the Civil 
War, which supported equality before the law, Unionist governments, and black 
suffrage. President Grant’s 1868 election marked the beginning of this decisive 
ideological transition to conservatism. Since 1868, intraparty conflict, economic 
expansion goals, the 1873 depression, and differing political attitudes explained in 
part radicalism’s demise within the moderate Republican camp. With these 
contextual factors, I closely review Republicans’ political realignment during 
Reconstruction, with a glance on the ideologies, figures, policies, and events 
involved. I am interested in this topic due to my extensive coursework in political 
science, where both state and non-state actors’ roles and actions influenced 
Republican realignment. The extent of this political change is debatable, given 
that some aspects changed, and others remained intact. My historiographical 
argument addresses how historians’ interpretations of Republican realignment 
have transformed over time. I more specifically utilize scholarly articles and 
monographs from various periods to discuss changing interpretations of 
realignment’s effects on freedmen.  
Republicans’ realignment characterizes a drastic point in Reconstruction. 
Tailoring these factors to my argument, I rely on the following sources to evaluate 
the prevalence of these attributes in several historiographical explanations. Each 
source finds the Grant presidency as the definitive point of conservatism’s 
replacement of radicalism. Earlier sources concentrate on broad ideological shifts 
and political events, but evidence since the 1960s mainly focuses on economics, 
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race, and specific political positions. While investigating these articles, I find the 
extent of realignment to be questionable and subjective based on context. 
Historians studying realignment attributed this extent to either a single factor, a 
principal factor with some background influences, or multiple factors. I organize 
my historiographical argument into three thematic categories of interpretation. 
The first group of historians includes William Dunning, William Hesseltine, and 
C. Vance Woodward. They view realignment as occurring due to a single 
overarching factor, with little discussion relative to other factors and issues like 
freedmen’s rights. Brooks Simpson and Nicholas Barreyre also posit that a single 
reason explains the Republican reversal, yet they also consider background 
factors in the shadow of the main explanation. As with Patrick Riddleberger’s 
interpretation in 1960, Stephen Prince and Lewis Gould’s recent historiographical 
arguments constitute the multifaceted nature of studying realignment, where 
factors encompass economics, civil rights, politics, and public opinion. I apply the 
latter groups’ interpretations to argue Republican realignment during 
Reconstruction occurred via multiple avenues. However, historians have 
considerable disagreement on dating Republican realignment according to the 
sequence of Reconstruction events. This conflict over dating yields to the 
complex and gradual characteristic of realignment. Its effects on freedmen must 
also be accounted for to better understand how realignment impacted not only 
those in the party but also people of color. With the sources used, Lewis Gould’s 
interpretation grasps concision, accuracy, and comprehensiveness to best 
demonstrate realignment as a multifaceted event, showing connections between 
national politics and freedmen’s rights. 
The Lone Transformation 
Historians before the 1960s approached Republican realignment as a 
noteworthy political event explained best by single, broad factors while 
overlooking other crucial considerations found in later interpretations. Discussion 
of realignment’s ramifications on freedmen’s rights is noticeably absent among 
these sources. In “The Second Birth of the Republican Party,” William Dunning 
evaluates the continuity of the Republican Party’s ideology since the Civil War 
through Reconstruction.1 First, Dunning writes that Republicans by the Civil 
War’s end, along with “War Democrats,” were essentially a “Union” party 
                                                     
1 William A. Dunning, “The Second Birth of the Republican Party,” The American Historical Review 16, 
no. 1 (1910): 56. doi:10.2307/1834308. 
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supporting the Union’s maintenance against Southern rebellion. Nevertheless, 
factions among them in 1866 took shape, where conservatives supported the 
Johnson administration’s Reconstruction plan, and radicals protested amnesty and 
espoused freedmen’s suffrage. Radicalism “nationalized” among Republicans in 
the 1866 elections, where it aimed to abandon Civil War era “sectionalism” in 
preference for African- American enfranchisement unifying the national party.2 
Dunning points that radicalism was an extreme ideology that manipulated the race 
issue out of “ignorance” to gain national popularity.3 By 1868, radicalism waned 
nationally because conservatism emerged as the dominant ideology among 
moderates. This additionally meant that the Republican Party no longer was the 
“Union” party. Dunning next states that this “rebirth” of Republicans’ core 
ideology of anti-slavery was manifested in the 1872 election, where their mission 
of emancipation and reunification was complete.4 While he finds that radicalism 
was a politically expedient war-time response in a divided country, Dunning only 
defines realignment as the abandonment of “sectionalism” and not in terms of 
deserting social policies.  
William Dunning’s interpretation of realignment, in light of an opportune 
political moment, is further elaborated by William Hesseltine as a response to 
failed economic policies. Hesseltine writes in “The Economic Factors in the 
Abandonment of Reconstruction” about Reconstruction faltering in the process of 
Republican realignment during this time.5 He argues that Republicans reneged on 
their core radical values because their political program failed to reap economic 
results for the South. Congressional Reconstruction originally came with the 
mindset that the South would repudiate its past views for industrial development 
and Northern investment, but it also “forced” black suffrage.6 In turn, investors 
could not prosper as they intended because of violence and feeble property rights 
protection. President Grant after 1868 permitted some states to remove 
disenfranchisement clauses of ex-Confederates from their constitutions.7 As 
Hesseltine demonstrates, Republican politicians switched positions because they 
                                                     
2 Ibid., 61. 
3 Ibid., 61. 
4 Ibid., 62. 
5 William B. Hesseltine, “Economic Factors in the Abandonment of Reconstruction,” The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 22, no. 2 (1935): 191. 
6 Ibid., 194. 
7 Ibid., 197.  
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were beholden to the “masters of capital” and wished to retain power.8 During the 
1874 congressional elections, Republicans acknowledged their defeat to 
Democrats by taking a less- interventionist stance in the South while also 
relegating their concern for the “race question” and support of carpetbagger 
governments.9 In comparison to Dunning, Hesseltine’s interpretation more 
accurately reflects how and why realignment occurred but only mentions 
economics as the main driving force behind the shift.  
C. Vann Woodward offers a slightly different explanation of realignment 
based on Republicans’ sympathies for the former Confederacy, instead of broad 
economic and ideological factors in Dunning and Hesseltine’s writings. In his 
monograph, Reunion & Reaction, Woodward studies the attitudes and rhetoric of 
the period leading up to the Compromise of 1877.10 First, the Compromise 
entailed Southern congressmen relinquishing their support for Samuel J. Tilden in 
the 1876 presidential election for Rutherford B. Hayes, but Hayes in return had to 
withdraw all federal troops in the South and give Democrats control over two 
state governments in the South. Next, Woodward writes that Hayes and the 
Republicans had to reverse their Southern policy because of public disapproval 
for intervention and “habitual” use of force in Reconstruction. However, he states 
that the 1876 election still positively portrayed Radical Reconstruction and waved 
the “bloody shirt,” which cried that Union blood was on Southerners’ hands.11 
Republicans only deserted their radical heritage for the Compromise because it 
was an opportune moment for political power. Furthermore, Woodward writes 
that Republicans saw “the Southern problem with new eyes” and began to 
resurrect their Hamiltonian Federalist and Whig ancestry.12 The author also 
depicts Republicans in “alliance with ex-rebels and ex-slaveholders.”13 
Woodward continues that this alliance “revealed the party of Carpetbaggery 
repudiating the Carpetbaggers, the party of emancipation and freedmen’s rights 
abandoning the Negro to his former master. It only meant that the Carpetbaggers 
had proved an ineffective means of controlling [freedmen’s] votes and it was 
hoped that the old masters might be more resourceful in accomplishing the same 
                                                     
8 Ibid., 198. 
9 Ibid., 209. 
10 C. V. Woodward, Reaction & Reunion (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), 1-3. 
11 Ibid., 24. 
12 Ibid., 36. 
13 Ibid., 228. 
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end.”14 The Republicans adapted the Redeemers’ policy for economic 
conservatism to form a new coalition. On the contrary, Hayes made the 
Compromise nuanced when he appointed both Democrats and Carpetbagger 
Republicans to state election offices. President Hayes, who was a conservative 
Republican with southern sympathies, was a key figure in finishing President 
Grant’s Southern policy. Woodward’s interpretation, along with Dunning and 
Hesseltine, picture Reconstruction-era Republicans as a party that swiftly 
responded to challenges out of the desire to maintain political power. All 
historians disagree on why and how specifically the Republican party abandoned 
radicalism, essentially Reconstruction as a political program.  
The Nuanced Transformation 
The next group of historians switch from an earlier focus on broad 
explanatory factors to a more expansive understanding that considers numerous 
background factors under a primary reason for realignment. Brooks Simpson 
researches reconciliatory attitudes toward the South with a narrower scope on 
several background factors, while the former historians have negated this 
approach. In “Ulysses S. Grant and the Failure of Reconstruction,” Simpson 
examines President Grant’s attitude of reconciliation and his role in shaping the 
demise of radicalism within the mainstream Republican Party.15 First, Simpson 
writes that radicals’ extreme view of progress was challenged by President 
Grant’s view in 1873 that freedmen’s safety was now a priority, not “social 
equality” through legislation.16 The author then gives a brief overview of General 
Grant’s reconciliatory attitude toward the South, where he first opposed President 
Johnson’s trial of Confederate officials, embraced amnesty, and removed black 
troops and Freedmen’s Bureau officials from their posts. Yet, Grant witnessed 
that Southerners were undeserving of complete amnesty because of violence and 
hateful rhetoric they incited against freedmen and Unionists.17 As President, Grant 
signed the Enforcement Acts that permitted the federal government to protect 
Southern blacks against violence.18 Also, he simultaneously protected the ex-
                                                     
14 Ibid., 229. 
15 Brooks D. Simpson, “Ulysses S. Grant and the Failure of Reconciliation,” Illinois Historical Journal 81, 
no. 4 (1988): 269. 
16 Ibid., 271. 
17 Ibid., 278.  
18 Ibid., 279. 
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rebels by stripping the Fourteenth Amendment’s punishments inflicted on them.19 
Above all, Simpson describes how President Grant fused his reconciliation 
approach with federal interventionism to appeal to moderates since he felt Radical 
Republicans in the South were inefficient and corrupt. This historiographical 
argument represents an individual level of analysis when examining realignment, 
where President Grant was at the center of Republican politics in the early 1870s 
and numerous background factors were considered under his strong influence. 
Simpson clearly connects national politics with freedmen’s rights but fails to 
equally weight other causal factors in realignment. He only introduces freedmen’s 
rights as a background factor. 
Nicolas Barreyre offers a more recent interpretation of Republican 
realignment. He follows Simpson’s reasoning in “The Politics of Economic 
Crises: The Panic of 1873, the End of Reconstruction, and the Realignment of 
American Politics,” attributing a single casual factor to this shift.20 He studies the 
Panic of 1873 as a crucial point in Reconstruction history, which first established 
“Gilded Age” issues of class tensions, labor unrest, and the “money question” 
during the post-war era. Barreyre writes that Republicans lost the 1874 
congressional elections largely because of their unpopular stance on the “money 
question” intertwined with other social and economic policies under 
Reconstruction. The “money question” involved the option either to expand credit 
access by printing more paper money or to restrict paper money in preference for 
gold reserves. Specifically, the 1873 depression harmed Southern Republicans 
because northern investment stagnated and the recently passed Civil Rights Act 
triggered Southern fury. Moreover, President Grant’s veto of the “Inflation Bill,” 
which would have circulated more paper money, significantly harmed Northern 
Republicans’ electoral prospects in 1874, where they lost Midwestern and 
Western turnout because of the “money question.”21 With Southern discontent 
and division within their own party, the Republicans had to push Reconstruction 
off their political agenda because of a newly elected Democratic Congress’s 
adamance against their policies.22 For Republicans, they had to realign 
ideologically by avoiding polarizing issues such as Reconstruction and the 
                                                     
19 Ibid., 279. 
20 Nicolas Barreyre, “The Politics of Economic Crises: The Panic of 1873, the End of Reconstruction, and 
the Realignment of American Politics,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 10, no. 4 (2011): 
403.  
21 Ibid., 415. 
22 Ibid., 420.  
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“money question,” which once united their party but now divided it. Barreyre 
particularly claims, “the 1873 crisis ended Reconstruction not so much because 
northerners had other things in mind (although shifting priorities did play a role), 
but because Republicans translated the crisis into the money question and proved 
utterly unable to convince voters they were doing anything meaningful to solve 
the problem.”23 Regarding Liberal Republicans, Barreyre states they were not a 
sufficient example of Republican realignment because they were a third party that 
simply and unsuccessfully reacted to economic crises. This historian’s argument 
draws upon evidence from the later years of Reconstruction, where economics 
was a propellent of political change. Although Barreyre considers factors outside 
the purview of economics, he does not seriously examine realignment’s 
comprehensive nature based on multiple causal factors because he still gives 
weight to economics as the overarching factor. A detailed look on economics may 
drive attention away attention of other factors of equal importance in 
Reconstruction. 
Change from All Sides 
While the previous two groups of historians formulated singular explanations 
on the Republican reversal, Patrick Riddleberger closely reviews the multifaceted 
nature of this political transformation. Riddleberger specifically explores the 
reasons and rhetoric behind the radicals’ reorientation of their stance on freedmen 
in “The Radicals’ Abandonment of the Negro During Reconstruction.”24 First, he 
finds that Radical Republicans significantly changed when they fractured into 
Stalwarts and Liberals in 1872. Even though both groups disassociated 
themselves from the “race question,” Riddleberger argues Liberal Republicans 
experienced a more extreme political transformation because of their departure 
from radical policies of federal intervention, land confiscation and redistribution, 
and black suffrage. Compared to their prior rhetoric and policies at the onset of 
Reconstruction, liberals during the early 1870s lamented corruption of radical-
controlled governments, the exploitation of the freedman as a “political issue,” 
and President Grant’s Southern policy.25 In turn, they embraced amnesty for 
Southerners, supported local governance, and rallied for the completion of 
                                                     
23 Ibid., 420.  
24 Patrick W. Riddleberger, “The Radicals’ Abandonment of the Negro During Reconstruction,” The 
Journal of Negro History 45, no. 2 (1960): 88, doi:10.2307/2716572. 
25 Ibid., 89. 
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Reconstruction with the ratified constitutional amendments protecting basic black 
rights. For the 1872 presidential election, Riddleberger claims Stalwarts still 
prioritized the freedman politically and defended his rights while liberals appealed 
to Southerners by advocating less government regulation for Southern control and 
Northern investment. Overall, this evaluation details how the Liberal Republican 
movement shaped post-Reconstruction Republican ideology, including the retreat 
on the freedmen’s political salience. Interpretations at this stage begin to 
acknowledge the complicated nature of realignment in having multiple causal 
factors. The only aspect Riddleberger falls short of is a detailed study of other 
factors besides liberals and Stalwarts.  
Lewis Gould next adds a more comprehensive dimension to Republican 
political realignment in showing the multiple factors involved in changing 
historical interpretations. He usefully presents most of the factors shown in 
previous interpretations but synthesizes those factors with the effects on 
freedmen’s rights. In a chapter entitled, “Republicans and Reconstruction, 1865-
1877,” in his monograph, Grand Old Party, Gould details the events, figures, 
policies, and ideologies that initiated Republicans’ flee from Reconstruction.26 
Following the Civil War, congressional Republicans varied on economic issues 
but were united in their reproach against the South and its treatment of former-
slaves. This party cohesion prompted them to oppose President Johnson’s efforts 
to derail Radical Reconstruction, where they overrode his veto of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866.27 By 1867, the electorate grew disillusioned with the radicals’ plans, 
especially when Northern states rejected freedmen’s suffrage.28 Republicans 
during the 1868 election shied away from freedmen’s suffrage in their party 
platforms and grew more concerned about economic issues, such as tariffs and 
business growth. President Grant’s scandal-ridden administration and intervention 
to protect Southern blacks thrust the Liberal Republicans into the national 
spotlight. Even though Liberal Republicanism faded after 1872, their ideology of 
laissez-faire capitalism and social conservatism outlasted their electoral defeat 
and motivated Republicans to abandon freedmen.29 The Panic of 1873 and 
growing social problems affected both parties, and the Compromise of 1877 
officially ended Reconstruction and turned Republicans away from civil rights. 
                                                     
26 Lewis L. Gould, Grand Old Party (New York: Random House, 2003), 42. 
27 Ibid., 49. 
28 Ibid., 54-55.  
29 Ibid., 67. 
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Most certainly, Gould notes the difficulty in studying this ideological 
transformation: “Although the outcome in 1877 did not signify complete 
Republican abandonment of black Americans, it did mark an important turning 
point in the nation’s approach to race. The South became less Republican and 
more segregated. Civil Rights would not return to the region for seventy-five 
years. In the America of 1877, there was little that Republicans could have done 
to avert this result. After a generation of trying to build a freer and more open 
society for all its citizens, the United States lapsed back into the customs and 
prejudices of the old.”30 Gould’s argument most successfully conceptualizes the 
complex and comprehensive character of realignment, recognizing that no 
individual factor can accurately describe the breadth of this crucial political event. 
Most significantly, comprehensiveness in Gould’s interpretation also gives way to 
accuracy and concision. The author’s argument holistically studies the multiple 
reasons involved in realignment and strategically organizes his claims in a 
detailed, concise manner. Gould uniquely captures all of the criteria I defined in 
my main argument, while other historians only view realignment from one angle. 
Although Gould’s interpretation is the most comprehensive and compelling 
work in this thematic group, Stephen Prince considers similar issues in the face of 
carpetbagger governments in the South propelling the Republican shift. In 
“Legitimacy and Interventionism: Northern Republicans, the ‘Terrible 
Carpetbagger,’ and the Retreat from Reconstruction,” Prince evaluates Northern 
Republicans’ change of rhetoric concerning carpetbaggers and how it shaped their 
abandonment of radicalism.31 Carpetbaggers, Northern Republicans who 
immigrated to the South for political influence, were once hailed as heroes that 
civilized the devastated former Confederacy with their ideologies and business 
ties.32 This group facilitated Radical Reconstruction, while in the midst of 
criticism from Democrats. However, Prince suggests Northern Republicans 
rebuked carpetbaggers after the 1872 presidential election when the Liberal 
Republicans disintegrated. Liberal Republicans emerged in the mainstream 
Republican wing when they decried federal intervention policies and corrupt 
carpetbagger governments.33 In turn, this realignment was symbolic because 
                                                     
30 Ibid., 76. 
31 Stephen K. Prince, “Legitimacy and Interventionism: Northern Republicans, the ‘Terrible 
Carpetbagger,’ and the Retreat from Reconstruction,” Journal of the Civil War Era 2, no. 4 (2012): 538.  
32 Ibid., 542. 
33 Ibid., 548. 
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Republicans felt that Reconstruction could no longer transform the South, given 
liberals’ compelling arguments.34 This reversal also hurt freedmen’s quest for 
security and civil rights because they relied on carpetbagger governments for 
these demands. Prince states the carpetbagger issue was how Republicans pushed 
radicalism and Reconstruction off their party agenda because of public backlash 
they received from politicians and newspapers. When evaluating the scope of this 
interpretation, recurring themes of rhetoric, public outcry, and influential 
ideologies are present in explaining realignment along with its effects on 
freedmen. Nevertheless, unlike Gould, Prince has not included economics as a 
factor and has not used a wider-spanning timeline to study realignment. Prince, 
along with Riddleberger, tends to give a wholesome view on realignment but his 
heavy weight for carpetbaggers makes his argument void of complete accuracy 
and concision.  
In studying realignment during Reconstruction, historians have proposed a 
swath of conclusions on when, how, and why Republicans’ political goals and 
approaches diverged from their strong heritage in radicalism. Historians before 
the 1960s theorize Republicans reformed their party in terms of singular reasons, 
including economics, ideology, and rhetoric and attitudes of “Southern 
sympathies.” These historians reflect a simpler understanding of realignment as a 
one-sided event best explained by a dominant factor. Sources from the 1960s and 
beyond address a combination of interpretations rooted in principal factors with 
background details and equally-weighted factors. Most importantly, these recent 
sources reveal the true value of history as a discipline: telling stories from 
multiple perspectives in a comprehensive fashion that upholds accuracy and 
showcases connections between seemingly different factors.  
Nonetheless, Lewis Gould’s interpretation of the multifaceted character of this 
topic, along with a detailed look at freedmen’s rights, adds another dimension to 
modern historical study that is not conspicuous in other sources. In addition, his 
wide-ranging historiographical argument does not sacrifice a descriptive 
explanation for the sake of concision but rather upholds both criteria. Gould 
enmeshes most of the factors considered by other historians to portray 
realignment’s complicated and gradual nature. He recognizes the equal role 
economics, political decisions, and public opinion played in this event. The latter 
group’s historians cannot compete with Gould’s level of analysis since they omit 
                                                     
34 Ibid., 552. 
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economics as a causal factor, making their accounts less accurate and concise. 
This author’s work sufficiently weighs the multiple factors and avoids giving 
preference to some factors over others. On a larger scale, Gould’s argument not 
only meets the specified criteria, but it also adheres to modern historical study’s 
emphasis on unraveling complexities in a complete, unbiased manner. History 
aspires to effectively explain complete stories and identify involved factors. 
Gould’s essay on realignment best fulfills the mission modern historians have 
long desired to achieve.  
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